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INTRODUCTION 
The art of patent prosecution is becoming more and more 
complicated, challenging, and risky.  In recent years, patent 
practitioners have endeavored to master the implications and 
strategic opportunities resulting from the American Inventors 
Protection Act1 and all of the associated rule changes.2  In addition, 
recent decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit and U.S. Supreme Court have necessitated significant changes 
in how patent applications are drafted and prosecuted.3  The Federal 
Circuit’s recent decision in Symbol Technologies, Inc. v. Lemelson 
Medical,4 holding that laches may “bar enforcement of patent claims 
issued after an unreasonable and unexplained delay in prosecution,”5 
adds to the challenge by raising questions about the extent to which 
patent applicants can take advantage of strategic opportunities 
presented by the patent statute and administrative rules of the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) without jeopardizing their 
rights.6 
Symbol Technologies also potentially implicates the ethical obligations 
of patent practitioners.  This issue—whether practitioners may be 
subject to discipline for purposefully delaying the prosecution of 
their clients’ patent applications—is considered below.  Because the 
                                                          
 1. Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 
35 U.S.C.) (amending the patent law and reorganizing the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (“PTO”)). 
 2. See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 1.902-.907 (2003) (permitting reexamination rights for 
third parties); 37 C.F.R. pts. 1 & 5 (2003) (providing for the public disclosure of 
patent applications after eighteen months); 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.701 & 1.702-.705 (2003) 
(compensating patentees for delays in the application examination process by 
providing patent term adjustments). 
 3. These decisions include the Federal Circuit and Supreme Court decisions in 
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000), 
vacated by 535 U.S. 722 (2002), and the Federal Circuit’s recent en banc decision in 
Johnson & Johnston Associates Inc. v. R.E. Service Co., 285 F.3d 1046 (Fed. Cir. 2002).  
The judgments in Festo concern the extent to which claim amendments made during 
prosecution impair a patentee’s ability to assert infringement under the judicially-
created doctrine of equivalents.  See Festo, 535 U.S. at 737-40 (concluding that while 
an amendment is not an absolute bar to infringement claims, a patentee must prove 
the amendment did not relinquish the equivalent in question).  In Johnson & 
Johnston, the Federal Circuit held that subject matter disclosed in a patent 
application, but not recited in the claims, is per se dedicated to the public.  285 F.3d 
at 1054. 
 4. 277 F.3d 1361, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1515 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 
U.S. 825 (2002). 
 5. Id. at 1363, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1516. 
 6. See generally Michael T. Hawkins, Prosecution Laches in the Wake of Symbol 
Technologies: What is “Unreasonable and Unexplained” Delay?, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1621, 
1655-60 (2003) (analyzing factors for distinguishing between legitimate “commercial 
gamesmanship” and “unreasonable and unexplained delay” for purposes of 
prosecution laches). 
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issue requires consideration of the history and contours of the 
“prosecution laches” doctrine, the development of the doctrine is 
first reviewed.7  Specifically, Part I of this Article examines the history 
of prosecution laches in the Supreme Court and the lower federal 
courts.  Part II then describes and analyzes the Federal Circuit’s 
decision in Symbol Technologies, and identifies questions it leaves 
unresolved.  Finally, Part III considers the extent to which the 
decision implicates the ethical obligations of prosecution counsel. 
I. PROSECUTION LACHES:  A HISTORY OF AMBIGUITY                                    
AND AMBIVALENCE 
A. Prosecution Laches in the Supreme Court 
1. Woodbridge and Webster 
Nearly eighty years ago, the Supreme Court had occasion to 
consider the effect of an applicant’s prosecution delays on its patent 
rights in a pair of cases.  In Woodbridge v. United States,8 the Court 
upheld a decision of the U.S. Court of Claims refusing to compensate 
an inventor for the alleged use of his invention by the United States.9  
The inventor filed his patent application, which involved rifle 
projectiles, in February 1852.10  The Patent Office examined the 
application and advised the inventor regarding allowable subject 
matter.  Woodbridge then amended his claims accordingly and 
requested that the Patent Office delay the issuance of his patent for 
one year, as was then authorized by statute.11  Neither the Patent 
Office nor the inventor took any action regarding the patent for the 
next nine and one-half years.12  In December 1861, however, the 
inventor wrote to the Patent Office requesting issuance of the patent 
                                                          
 7. “Prosecution laches” has alternatively been referred to as “continuing 
application laches” or “undue delay of prosecution.”  See generally Thomas G. 
Eschweiler, Ford v. Lemelson and Continuing Application Laches, 79 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 401, 403 (1997) (attempting to answer whether the 
“continuing application laches” defense is still a viable defense by analyzing the 
history and development of the relevant case law and legislative histories). 
 8. 263 U.S. 50 (1923). 
 9. Id. at 51, 63. 
 10. Id. at 51. 
 11. Id. at 52-53.  According to the Woodbridge Court, this statute authorized a 
delay of up to one year to give the inventor time to prepare and submit a model.  Id. 
at 58.  The inventor had already submitted his model, but requested the delay to 
prevent publication of the patent from affecting the possibility of obtaining a patent 
in a foreign jurisdiction.  See id. at 52, 58.  The Court noted, though, that he never 
applied for a foreign patent.  Id. at 58. 
 12. Id. at 53. 
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and noted that he had “allowed [the patent] to remain until the 
present time, it being only lately that any immediate opportunity of 
rendering it pecuniarily available has occurred.”13  At the same time, 
Woodbridge also requested certain broadening amendments.14 
The Patent Office refused to issue the patent, with or without the 
amendments, on the ground of abandonment.15  According to the 
Patent Office, many inventors had obtained patents and made 
advancements in this field of invention while Woodbridge 
unjustifiably delayed the issuance of his patent until he could exploit 
its commercial value.16  Likewise, the Court of Claims refused the 
inventor’s request for compensation for the government’s alleged use 
of the invention on the ground that his deliberate delay in requesting 
issuance of the approved patent resulted in an unenforceable patent 
as a matter of equity.17 
The Supreme Court affirmed, stating the legislative purpose 
behind the seventeen-year non-extendable term enacted in 1861 was 
to permit unencumbered public access to the invention following its 
expiration.  The court stated that “[a]ny practice by the inventor . . . 
through which he deliberately and without excuse postpones beyond 
the date of the actual invention, the beginning of the term of his 
monopoly, . . . is an evasion of the statute.”18  The Court explained its 
decision that the inventor had forfeited his right to a patent as 
follows: 
In this case we have a delay of 9 1/2 years in securing a patent that 
might have been had at any time in that period for the asking, and 
this for the admitted purpose of making the term of the monopoly 
square with the period when the commercial profit from it would be 
highest.  Not until war or fear of war came was there likely to be a 
strong demand for rifled cannon and their improvement.  Hence the 
inventor, having put his order for the issue of a patent into the secret 
archives of the Patent Office in 1852, sat down and waited until after 
the Civil War came on in 1861 before seeking to avail himself of the 
patent, thus postponing the time when the public could freely enjoy it 
for nearly 10 years.  Meantime other inventors had been at work in 
the same field and had obtained patents without knowledge of the 
situation . . . .  When [the inventor] conceived that the time . . . had 
                                                          
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See id. at 54 (noting that the PTO informed Woodbridge that the “length of 
time he had allowed his invention to slumber was a bar to the issue of the patent”). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 55. 
 18. Id. at 56. 
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come to assert his monopoly, he became aware of the fact that in his 
specifications and claims, as allowed, he had not covered the real 
advance made by his unconscious competitors, [and] he applied for a 
change of specifications and claims, so that he might cover the 
patents of these subsequent inventors.19 
In particular, the Court noted that had the inventor “succeeded in 
his illegal plan,” nearly ten years of “unconscionable postponement 
of the end of his monopoly” would have resulted.20 
The following year, in Webster Electric Co. v. Splitdorf Electric Co.,21 the 
Supreme Court again refused to enforce patent claims filed after 
what the Court regarded as an “unreasonable” delay.22  The patent at 
issue in Webster was a divisional of an application originally filed in 
February 1910.23  A first divisional application was filed in 1914 for the 
purpose of provoking an interference with another party’s issued 
patent.24  The divisional at issue in Webster was filed in 1915 to provoke 
yet another interference.  However, the claims at issue, which were 
broader than those copied for purposes of the interference and were 
apparently filed after the applicant lost the interference, were not 
added until 1918.25 
In refusing to enforce the claims at issue, the Supreme Court noted 
that the inventor had no intention to assert claims to the subject 
matter in question until after that subject matter “was disclosed and 
in general use.”26  According to the Court, the inventor “simply stood 
by and awaited developments” during the period of “unreasonable 
delay and neglect.”27  That the inventor was engaged for several of the 
                                                          
19.   Id. 
 20. Id. at 58-59. 
 21. 264 U.S. 463 (1924). 
 22. Id. at 466. 
 23. Id. at 464.  A patent applicant may only receive one patent per invention.  See 
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).  Accordingly, when an application presents claims to two or 
more independent and distinct inventions, the Commissioner may require the 
applicant to restrict its claims to a single invention for prosecution within that 
application.  See id. § 121.  The application carved out of the earlier application is a 
“divisional application.”  Assuming proper compliance with Section 120, the 
divisional application is entitled to the same filing date as the parent application 
from which it arose.  See id. (“If the other invention is made the subject of a divisional 
application which complies with the requirements of Section 120 of this title it shall 
be entitled to the benefit of the filing date of the original application.”). 
 24. Webster, 264 U.S. at 464. 
 25. See id. at 464-65 (characterizing the applicant as negligent for waiting eight 
years and four months after the initial filing to assert the broader claims). 
 26. Id. at 465. 
 27. Id.  The Court distinguished the situation in Webster from “the simple case of 
a division of a single application for several independent inventions” by noting that 
the claims at issue were added after the conclusion of interferences involving 
narrower claims.  Id. at 465-66. 
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eight years between the filing of the parent application and the 
amendment adding the claims at issue in separate interferences with 
different third parties “afford[ed] no just excuse for the failure to 
assert the broader claims.”28  To the contrary, the Court regarded the 
“long delay” as evidence supporting the conclusion that the claims at 
issue were “an exigent afterthought, rather than a logical 
development of the original application.”29 
2. Intervening adverse rights 
The other Supreme Court decisions relating to the effect of 
applicant delays on patent rights concern the definition and 
significance of “intervening adverse rights.”  In Overland Motor Co. v. 
Packard Motor Car Co.,30 the Court held that an infringement suit 
cannot be dismissed merely because the patentee repeatedly took 
advantage of the entire statutory period for responding to Patent 
Office actions and voluntarily filed a divisional application to obtain 
                                                          
 28. See id. at 466.  Although the claims at issue in Webster were broader than those 
involved in the interferences, they did not, according to the Court, embrace subject 
matter “of such complicated character that it might not have been readily described 
in the original applications.”  Id. 
 29. Id.  In holding the inventor’s patent rights forfeited, the Webster Court noted 
the importance of not interpreting the patent so narrowly as to discourage “creative 
genius,” but further observed that “it is no less important that the law shall not be so 
loosely construed and enforced as to subvert its limitations, and bring about an 
undue extension of the patent monopoly against private and public rights.”  Id. 
In an apparent effort to delineate the boundary between reasonable and 
unreasonable delay, the Webster Court devoted the remainder of its opinion to 
endorsing a two-year time limit on the filing of divisional applications “in cases 
involving laches, equitable estoppel or intervening private or public rights.”  See id. at 
466-71 (determining that two years is the presumptive limit for an unreasonable 
delay).  According to the Court, the two-year limit, avoidable only “by proof of special 
circumstances justifying a longer delay,” was defended by way of analogy to the then-
applicable, judge-made prohibition against enforcing reissue patents sought more 
than two years after original issuance.  Id.  The two-year reissue limit had itself been 
adopted by analogy to the various statutes in effect at the time that imposed a limit of 
two years for filing applications, including a two-year pre-filing public use grace 
period.  Id. at 470-71. 
Several years later, the Supreme Court acknowledged that its pronouncements in 
Webster regarding a two-year limit on divisional applications were dicta.  See Crown 
Cork & Seal Co. v. Ferdinand Gutmann Co., 304 U.S. 159, 167 (1938) (asserting that 
the two-year limit pronouncements were made merely to clarify the lower court’s 
erroneous interpretation).  In Crown Cork, however, the significance of intervening 
adverse rights, or more precisely the lack thereof, was placed squarely in issue by the 
intermediate appellate court’s ruling invalidating a patent granted on a divisional 
application filed more than two years after a patent issued on the original 
application.  Id.  The Crown Cork Court clarified the Webster two-year “rule,” holding 
that filing a divisional application more than two years after an original application 
was not subject to the Webster two-year limitation without intervening adverse rights.  
See id. at 161, 164, 167-68 (condoning delay where there was no adverse use of the 
previously disclosed but unclaimed invention prior to the filing date of the divisional 
application upon which the patent in dispute eventually issued). 
 30. 274 U.S. 417 (1927). 
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the claim at issue after it had been finally rejected in the parent 
application.31  Given the facts at issue in Symbol Technologies, discussed 
below,32 several aspects of Overland Motor are worth noting.  First, it 
was undisputed that the patentee fully complied with all applicable 
statutory and Patent Office requirements.33  Second, the patentee 
offered no excuse for the delay.34  Third, in declining to act in equity 
to authorize dismissal of the infringement action, even when 
confronted with the infringement defendant’s account of the 
potential for the perpetration of mischief via prosecution delay,35 the 
Court pled infirmity, declaring that it was wholly within the realm of 
Congress, not the courts, to reduce the statutory time period.36  
However, as has been argued elsewhere,37 the key to understanding 
the Court’s refusal to intervene in equity appears to lie in its further 
observation that “[w]e do not know on what principle we could apply 
the equitable doctrine of abandonment by laches in a case where the 
measure of reasonable promptness is fixed by statute, and no other 
ground appears by reason of which laches could be imputed to the applicant.”38  
The Court observed that there was no product on the United States 
market prior to the issuance of the patent involving the subject 
matter of the suit.39  It also characterized Woodbridge as an 
“exceptional” case in which the patent applicant sought “to postpone 
the period of its monopoly until a national emergency might arise in 
which his invention, which was for rifling cannon, should be more in 
                                                          
 31. Id. at 422-24.  The applicant in Overland Motor had, on at least eight different 
occasions during prosecution of the parent and divisional applications, taken more 
than eleven months to respond to outstanding office actions.  Id. at 419.  The 
statutory period for response at the time was one year.  Id. at 422-23. 
 32. See infra notes 117-129 and accompanying text. 
 33. Overland Park, 274 U.S. at 422-24. 
 34. See id. at 422 (conceding there is no requirement that applicant respond with 
utmost diligence provided such response is made within the time period allowed by 
statute). 
 35. The infringement defendant argued that: 
[B]y waiting a year after each official action [an applicant can:] (1) keep his 
application pending so as to enable him to withhold, indefinitely, his 
invention from the public, (2) add claims to his application covering the 
independent intervening developments of others, and (3) postpone the time 
when the public may enjoy the free use of the invention—all contrary to 
sound public policy. 
Id. at 423. 
 36. See id. (indicating that Congress reduced the time period from an indefinite 
time period in 1861, to two years in 1897, and to six months in 1927). 
 37. See David L. Marcus, Is the Submarine Patent Torpedoed?:  Ford Motor Co. v. 
Lemelson and the Revival of Continuation Application Laches, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 521, 548 
(1997) (suggesting that the Supreme Court’s refusal to derail the infringement suit 
in Overland Motor was attributable to the absence of equitable justifications 
supporting such a result). 
 38. Overland Motor, 274 U.S. at 424 (emphasis added). 
 39. Id. at 420. 
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demand than it then was.”40  These aspects of the Court’s analysis 
support interpreting Overland Motor to mean that even extended 
prosecution delay that postpones the expiration date of the 
patentee’s right of exclusion does not justify equitable intervention in 
the absence of intervening adverse rights. 
The Court’s decision in General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western 
Electric Co.41 further confirms that intervening adverse rights are 
essential to a challenge based on prosecution delay.  The petitioner 
in General Talking Pictures based its challenge on the patentee’s first 
presentation of claims in a voluntary divisional or “continuation” 
application42 more than two years after the patentee’s own public use 
of the claimed invention.43  Noting that the claims of both the 
continuation and original applications had the same effective dates, 
that the only public use of the invention at issue was the patentee’s 
own, and that that public use did not precede the filing dates of the 
original applications by more than two years (so as not to run afoul of 
then-applicable statutory two-year pre-filing grace period), the Court 
rejected the challenge.44 
Taken together, the relevant Supreme Court decisions45 thus 
illustrate that a patent challenger must establish that adverse rights 
arose, or at least existed, during the period of alleged prosecution 
delay.46  In addition, Woodbridge and Webster suggest that a challenger 
can rely, for this purpose, on the intervening rights of third parties.47  
                                                          
 40. Id. at 426-27. 
 41. 304 U.S. 175 (1938).  The Court decided General Talking Pictures on the same 
day as Crown Cork, discussed supra note 29. 
 42. A continuation application is a patent application filed during the pendency 
in the PTO of an original parent application that employs the identical disclosure.  A 
continuation application may not include new additional material in the 
specification.  See Applied Materials, Inc. v. Advanced Semiconductor Materials 
America, Inc., 98 F.3d 1568, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 
117 S. Ct. 1822 (1997) (noting that a continuation application is based solely on the 
disclosure of the parent application). 
 43. Gen. Talking Pictures, 304 U.S. at 182; see also Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. 
Ferdinand Gutmann Co., 304 U.S. 159, 167 (1938) (explaining further the Webster 
Court’s rationale for the two-year “rule”). 
 44. Gen. Talking Pictures, 304 U.S. at 183.  Justice Black, dissenting, apparently 
doubted the legitimacy of divisional and continuation applications generally, and 
would have invalidated the claims in question because they were presented more 
than two years after the invention was in public use.  See id. at 188-90 (noting that 
divisional and continuation applications were not then authorized by statute). 
 45. The Supreme Court has not had occasion to further refine the doctrine of 
prosecution laches since its decisions in Crown Cork and General Talking Pictures. 
 46. The decision in General Talking Pictures established that the patentee’s public 
activities during the period of delay are irrelevant, as long as the claims in question 
are entitled to the benefit of a filing date within the statutory grace period.  Id. at 
182. 
 47. In Woodbridge v. United States, 263 U.S. 50, 56-57 (1923), the United States was 
the challenger, and the Supreme Court referred to “other inventors” and “many 
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However, several important questions were left unresolved by these 
decisions.  First, what activities or events qualify as “adverse rights”?  
Second, is a challenge based on prosecution delay limited to claims 
that were first presented or broadened after the adverse rights arose, 
or is it enough that the claims in question issued after significant 
applicant delay?48 
With regard to the first of these questions, the Court in Woodbridge 
referred to the work of other inventors, including those who had 
obtained patents, and the government’s use of their “advances in the 
art.”49  In Webster, the Court noted that the subject matter in question 
“was disclosed and in general use” prior to the presentation of the 
challenged claims,50 but did not say where or how the subject matter 
had been disclosed or used.  However, in ascribing no significance to 
the fact that the subject matter at issue had been disclosed in U.S. 
and foreign publications and actually used “abroad” during the 
pendency of the patentee’s U.S. patent applications,51 the Court in 
Overland Motor appears to have excluded U.S. and foreign 
publications, as well as use in foreign countries, from the definition 
of intervening adverse rights.  Subject matter patented in the United 
States, though, appears to qualify,52 as does domestic use of the 
invention recited in the claims at issue.53 
                                                          
inventors” who were working in the “same field” as that of the plaintiff and who had 
“obtained patents” and “made advances [that] the government had used . . . .”  
Similarly, the Court in Webster Electric Co. v. Slitdorf Electric Co., 264 U.S. 463, 465 
(1924), noted that the subject matter in question “was disclosed and in general use.” 
 48. A related, arguably unresolved, question is whether forfeiture may be found 
in the absence of the filing of a second or subsequent patent application.  Although 
no such application was filed in Woodbridge, the inventor unsuccessfully sought to 
amend his patent when he requested that it issue.  Woodbridge, 263 U.S. at 54.  The 
patent rights in question issued only after the inventor succeeded in procuring 
special congressional legislation.  Id. at 51.  The peculiar facts presented in 
Woodbridge are, therefore, arguably analogous to the procurement of patent rights by 
way of continuation application, as well as the other pertinent Supreme Court cases 
involving continuation or divisional applications. 
 49. See id. at 57 (discussing the repercussions that every patentee faces by 
withholding his inventiveness from the public). 
 50. Webster, 264 U.S. at 465. 
 51. See Overland Motor Co. v. Packard Motor Car Co., 274 U.S. 417, 419-20 
(1927) (holding that use of the subject matter abroad only implicated the original 
and divisional applications, but not the particular claims in suit). 
 52. From the context in which the Woodbridge Court refers to the “many patents 
[that] had issued for the same invention,” it appears that at least some of the patents 
in question were U.S. patents.  See Woodbridge, 263 U.S. at 54 (noting that because the 
patent application in question was held for the nine and one-half year period of 
delay in the Patent Office’s “secret archives,” the application was “locked up, not 
merely beyond the reach of the public, but beyond even the cognizance of the 
examiners” and that, in the “meantime many patents had issued for the same 
invention”) (emphasis added). 
 53. Overland Motor, 274 U.S. at 420. 
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As to whether prosecution laches is limited to situations where 
claims are added or changed after adverse rights arose, the claims at 
issue in Woodbridge were those that were pending before the invention 
was used by others,54 whereas those challenged in Webster had been 
introduced after the asserted intervening uses.55  On the one hand, 
this may indicate that prosecution laches may be found even where 
the claims at issue were not added or broadened after the adverse 
use.  However, the unusual circumstances of Woodbridge make 
drawing any conclusion regarding this issue difficult. 
Overland Motor presented the Court with an opportunity to provide 
guidance.  There, the applicant’s claims to the “subject matter in suit” 
were apparently presented before, and were pending throughout, the 
period of delay.56  However, by distinguishing Woodbridge without 
commenting on the significance of the late presentation of claims in 
that case, the Court left open the question of whether such action is 
an element of the defense.57 
B.  The Lower Federal Courts Struggle with Prosecution Laches 
Although the Supreme Court cases relating to prosecution laches 
left unanswered certain questions regarding the precise contours of 
the doctrine, they left no doubt that patent rights were, in some 
circumstances, subject to forfeiture based on applicant delay.  In the 
years since the Supreme Court’s last decision on the subject, the 
lower federal courts have disagreed regarding not only when 
forfeiture is appropriate, but whether a patent can ever be held 
invalid or unenforceable under a prosecution laches theory. 
                                                          
 54. The opinion in Woodbridge states that the Patent Office refused to issue the 
patent with or without the requested amendment following the period of delay.  
Woodbridge, 263 U.S. at 54.  Subsequently, however, the inventor in Woodbridge 
secured special legislation granting him patent rights subject to the condition that he 
satisfy the court that he had not forfeited his rights by delay.  Id. at 51.  See also 
Overland Motor, 274 U.S. at 418 (noting the particular legislation upon which the 
inventor in Woodbridge relied for the purpose of obtaining his patent).  He was, 
however, apparently relegated to the claims that had been allowed before the delay.  
See Woodbridge, 263 U.S. at 63 (concluding that Woodbridge’s delay in requesting 
issuance constituted forfeiture of his right to a patent). 
 55. Webster, 264 U.S. at 464-65. 
 56. See Overland Motor, 274 U.S. at 419 (describing the particular facts relating to 
the petitioner’s initial and subsequent patent applications). 
 57. If applicant delay plus intervening adverse rights plus the “late” introduction 
of new or broader claims is required to establish prosecution laches, other questions 
remain unanswered.  For example, are claims that were pending before the delay 
began also tainted because they issue in the same patent with “late” claims (i.e., do all 
of the claims of a patent tainted by delay fall together)?  And must adverse rights 
originate during the delay, as opposed to before it begins? 
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In several cases, patent challengers succeeded in invoking a 
prosecution laches-style defense.  For example, in Pratt & Whitney Co. 
v. United States,58 the U.S. Court of Claims dismissed a petition for 
compensation from the United States where the asserted claims were 
first presented in a divisional application filed nine years after the 
parent application was filed and six years after the accused device was 
“in public use and on sale.”59  Similarly, in Monsanto Co. v. Rohm & 
Haas Co.,60 the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
held invalid claims presented almost ten years after the application 
containing the supporting disclosure was filed, seven and a half years 
after the patentee learned of the defendant’s South African patent 
claiming the same chemical compound, approximately seven years 
after representatives of the patentee attended a conference where a 
U.S. government official described the compound’s herbicidal 
properties, and almost six years after the patentee learned that the 
defendant was selling the compound as a herbicide.61 
Other courts were less hospitable to the defense.  Several relied on 
the express provision in 35 U.S.C. § 12062 that claims supported by an 
earlier-filed disclosure in a parent application are entitled to the 
benefit of the parent’s filing date if the requirements of Section 120 
are met.63  According to one court: 
                                                          
 58. 345 F.2d 838, 145 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 429 (Ct. Cl. 1965). 
 59. Id.  at 843-44, 145 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 432-33. 
 60. 312 F. Supp. 778, 164 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 556 (E.D. Pa. 1970). 
 61. Id. at 783-85, 164 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 560-62.  The original patent application 
disclosed a large class of compounds and stated that the compounds possessed 
herbicidal activity.  The application also included claims to herbicidal compositions 
and method of use claims, but no claim to any compound per se was presented during 
its prosecution.  Id. at 783-85, 164 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 560-61.  The patentee filed a 
continuation-in-part application one month after the patentee learned of the 
defendant’s sales of the compound in question, but again did not include claims to 
that or any other compound per se.  Id. at 784-85, 164 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 561-62.  
Several years later, after an interference involving that application was declared 
between the patentee and the eventual defendant in the infringement action, the 
patentee filed a motion to add a claim to the compound to the application.  The 
motion was denied.  Id. at 785, 164 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 562.  The application that 
resulted in the patent in suit, including the claim at issue, was filed nearly three years 
after the attempt to amend the continuation-in-part application, almost six years 
after that application was filed.  Id., 164 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 562. 
A divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s judgment of invalidity, but confined its discussion to the district 
court’s ruling that the patent was procured by fraudulent misrepresentation.  See 
Monsanto Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 456 F.2d 592, 596, 600-01, 172 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 
323, 325-26, 329 (3d Cir. 1972) (holding that the patentee’s failure to disclose 
important information in his application was contrary to equitable standards of 
conduct owed to the public). 
 62. 35 U.S.C. § 120 (2000). 
 63. See, e.g., Haney v. Timesavers, Inc., 900 F. Supp. 1378, 1382 (D. Or. 1995) 
(noting that “35 U.S.C. § 120 expressly permits [the patentee] to file additional 
applications to obtain additional claims”); see also Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. 
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By providing this relation back doctrine, Congress evidenced a 
clear intent to regulate the timing of continuation applications.  
Accordingly, only Congress can determine what constitutes 
unreasonable delay in the filing of such an application.  It is not for 
this Court to decide that the prosecution of a patent according to 
the rules of the PTO is unreasonable and inequitable.64 
Another court distinguished Woodbridge as limited to situations 
where the patentee had delayed to achieve a postponement of the 
term of the patent.65  The same court appeared to have more 
difficulty with Webster, where the term was not extended in the 
Woodbridge sense, since the claims at issue were presented in a 
divisional application that complied with the applicable law.66  
Although it regarded Webster as “closely analogous,” it nonetheless 
denied the patent challengers’ motion for summary judgment based 
on laches because the defendants had “little evidence” that the claims 
at issue were presented as a “mere afterthought.”67  The court further 
                                                          
v. Medtronic, Inc., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1770, 1774-75, No. C-96-0942 DLJ, 1996 WL 
467273, at **4-5 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 1996) (striking with prejudice an affirmative 
defense reciting laches and estoppel due to prosecution delay “since there is no 
allegation that plaintiff violated any of the statutory or regulatory rules for 
prosecuting patents”); Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., 40 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1291, 1295, No. C-95-3577 DLJ, 1996 WL 467293, at **11-12 (N.D. 
Cal. July 24, 1996) (dismissing with prejudice the defendant’s counterclaims based 
on laches and improper delay for the same reasons); Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., 
Inc. v. SciMed Sys., Inc., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1291, 1294-95, No. C-96-0950 DLJ, 
1996 WL 467277, at **3-4 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 1996) (striking with prejudice the 
defendant’s patent misuse defense grounded on alleged unreasonable prosecution 
delay and late presentation of claims for the same reasons). 
In all of the Advanced Cardiovascular opinions, the District Court for the Northern 
District of California delineated the boundaries of the defense of laches, observing 
that “the only delay that can form the basis of a laches defense is delay between the 
issuance of the patent and the filing of the infringement action.”  Medtronic, 41 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774, 1996 WL 467273, at *4; Medtronic, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
at 1294, 1996 WL 467293, at *11.  See also SciMed Sys., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1294, 
1996 WL 467277, at *4 (holding that “defendant’s theory of laches based on delay in 
prosecution of the patent is not cognizable”). 
 64. Medtronic, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775, 1996 WL 467273, at *5; Medtronic, 40 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1295, 1996 WL 467293, at *12; SciMed Sys., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) at 1295, 1996 WL 467277, at *4. 
 65. See Progressive Games, Inc. v. Amusements Extra, Inc., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 
1183, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1849, 1852 (D. Colo. 1999) (noting that derivative 
patents at issue were subject to the same termination date as the original patent and 
therefore the plaintiff here had not postponed the date of its patent monopoly, 
making Woodbridge inapplicable). 
 66. See id. at 1184-85, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1852-53 (stating that the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Crown Cork limited the laches doctrine to cases involving both 
intervening adverse rights and proof of abandonment by the patentee). 
 67. Id. at 1184, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1852.  In this regard, the court seemed to 
rely on the fact that the first claim of the parent patent, which, like the continuation 
patents in suit, related to electronic poker gaming was, in essence, a genus claim 
encompassing different types of jackpots.  See id. at 1181, 1184, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
at 1850, 1853 (describing the particular gaming device and concluding that the 
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professed its reluctance to apply laches to an alleged prosecution 
delay situation when the Federal Circuit had not done so.68 
These decisions generally reflect the lower courts’ discomfort with 
abrogating patent rights obtained in compliance with the applicable 
statutory and regulatory provisions.  This is particularly so in cases 
arising after the codification, in the 1952 Patent Act, of the principle 
that claims filed in continuing applications that comply with the law 
are entitled to the benefit of their respective priority dates.69  The 
most public display of this ambivalence is found in the series of 
                                                          
plaintiff’s delay may have been caused by circumstances beyond his control).  
According to the court, “it cannot be said that [the patentee] filed the three patents 
at issue in this case as an afterthought, when its original application allowed for the 
[specific] type of jackpot encompassed by those patents.”  Id. at 1184, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) at 1852-53. 
 68. See id. at 1184-85, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1853 (confirming that while the 
Federal Circuit had recognized the possibility for equitable remedies in patent cases 
involving lack of diligence, it had yet to apply such remedies to continuation or 
continuation-in-part applications).  Like others, this court also noted the absence of 
a legislative limit on the filing of continuation applications.  Id. at 1185, 51 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1853. 
Notably, it appears that all of the court’s observations relating to the applicability 
of prosecution laches precedent and the legitimacy of the defense in light of 
congressional silence were dicta, as the court indicated that the defendants had 
failed to establish that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the 
patentee was even responsible for the alleged delay.  Id., 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 
1853. 
 69. See 35 U.S.C. § 120 (2000) (providing the benefit of the filing date of a first 
patent application to a subsequent patent application as long as, inter alia, the prior 
application has not been abandoned, terminated, or patented as of when the 
subsequent application is filed).  The effect of the enactment of Section 120 in 1952 
on the defense of prosecution laches has been the subject of significant debate.  
Compare Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., 277 F.3d 1361, 1369-71, 61 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1515, 1520-23 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Newman, J., dissenting) 
(expressing the view that Congress, in enacting Section 120 without limits on 
continuation applications, rejected the viability of prosecution laches as a defense), 
Ricoh Co. v. Nashua Corp., 185 F.3d 884, No. 97-1344, 1999 WL 88969, at *3 (Fed. 
Cir. Feb. 18, 1999) (refusing to apply the doctrine of intervening rights to limit 
patent rights obtained via continuing applications, given the lack of any time limit in 
Section 120), Bott v. Four Star Corp., 848 F.2d 1245, Nos. 88-1117, 88-1118, 1988 WL 
54107, at *1 (Fed. Cir. May 26, 1988) (refusing to act in equity to limit patent rights 
procured via a series of seven continuation applications “when the Congress gave no 
indication that it intended to do so”), and Ford Motor Co. v. Lemelson, 42 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1706, 1709, Nos. CV-N-92-613-LDG, CV-N-92-545-LDG, 1997 WL 
294430, at *1709 (D. Nev. Apr. 28, 1997) (interpreting the legislative history of 
Section 120 as reflecting congressional intent to impose no limits on continuation 
application practice), with Symbol Techs., 277 F.3d at 1365-66, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 
1518-19 (rejecting the patentee’s argument that Congress abrogated the defense of 
prosecution laches by passing Section 120).  See generally Eschweiler, supra note 7, at 
408-13 (tracing the legislative history of Section 120 and concluding that the defense 
of prosecution laches survived its enactment); Marcus, supra note 37, at 560-63 
(arguing that Congress, when passing Section 120, intended to preserve the laches 
defense). 
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decisions issued by the federal district court for the District of Nevada 
in Ford Motor Co. v. Lemelson.70 
Jerome Lemelson procured hundreds of U.S. patents between 1953 
and his death in 1997.71  The eleven patents at issue in Ford Motor 
related to “Auto-ID” and “machine vision” technology,72 and issued 
from continuing applications claiming priority back to an application 
filed in 1954.73 
In her report to the court recommending that Ford’s motion for 
summary judgment of unenforceability for “continuing application 
laches” be granted,74 the magistrate judge rejected Ford’s argument 
that a statutory two-year limit on obtaining broadened claims via 
reissue also limits a patentee’s efforts to obtain new claims via 
continuing applications.75  However, the magistrate judge determined 
that prosecution laches can, and should, bar the enforcement of 
patent claims procured by unreasonably delaying the presentation of 
claims during prosecution where the delay results in prejudice to the 
patent challenger.76 
                                                          
 70. Ford Motor Co. v. Lemelson, Nos. CV-N-92-613-LDG, CV-N-92-545-LDG, 1995 
WL 628330, at *15 (D. Nev. June 16, 1995) (recommending that “Ford’s motion for 
summary judgment based upon Lemelson’s undue delay in prosecuting his claims” 
be granted); Ford Motor Co. v. Lemelson, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1349, No. CV-N-92-
545-LDG, 1996 WL 673595 (D. Nev. Apr. 11, 1996) (adopting magistrate judge’s 
recommendation); Ford Motor Co. v. Lemelson, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1706, Nos. 
CV-N-92-613-LDG, CV-N-92-545-LDG, 1997 WL 294430 (D. Nev. Apr. 28, 1997) 
(vacating order adopting magistrate judge’s recommendation and denying Ford’s 
motion for summary judgment). 
 71. Nicholas Varchaver, The Patent King, FORTUNE, May 14, 2001, at 202, 204 
(describing, in detail, Lemelson’s aggressive and unprecedented campaign to 
acquire and license patents relating to a wide spectrum of industries, products, and 
licensing targets). 
 72. Ford Motor, 1995 WL 628330, at *1.  “Auto-ID” is a type of bar code and 
“Machine vision” incorporates cameras to inspect items on an assembly line and 
compare the procured images with those stored in memory to detect defects.  Id. 
 73. See id. at **10-12 (detailing the prosecution lineage of the claims in suit). 
 74. See id. at *2 (noting that summary judgment was appropriate because the 
availability of laches as a defense based on prosecution delay is a pure question of law 
and no relevant facts were in dispute). 
 75. See id. at **4-5 (explaining the procedures for continuation and 
continuation-in-part applications). 
 76. See id. at **5-14 (discussing the patentee’s actions in delaying prosecution 
and evaluating whether such actions constituted unreasonable delay).  The 
magistrate judge specifically identified “prejudice to Ford” as the second element 
(along with unreasonable applicant delay) of the defense of prosecution laches.  See 
id. at *15 (confirming that Ford’s proof that the products were either in 
development or on the market prior to the patentee’s asserted claims demonstrated 
undue prejudice).  In this brief portion of her opinion, however, the magistrate 
judge also stated that “Lemelson’s continuing application practice imposes prejudice 
upon all manufacturers or users of related products because” it implicates “all 
technological advancement arguably related to his 1954 and 1956 applications.”  Id.  
She thus failed to clarify whether an accused infringer could prevail on a prosecution 
laches theory in the absence of personal prejudice. 
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To support this conclusion, the magistrate judge noted, by way of 
analogy to the doctrine of unenforceability based on inequitable 
conduct,77 that equity can extinguish or limit patent rights based on 
applicant conduct.78  She rejected the “extreme view” advanced by 
Lemelson, who argued that the statutory scheme immunizes a 
patentee from attack based on a theory of prosecution laches no 
matter how many continuing applications he employs or how long 
after filing the original disclosure he presents new claims.79  She also 
rejected Lemelson’s characterization of the applicable precedent and 
his assignment of responsibility for the delay to the PTO.80  The 
magistrate judge found the reason for the delay, namely Lemelson’s 
desire to wait for products to appear on the market before drafting 
claims to cover them, unreasonable.81  She further rejected 
Lemelson’s argument that the Federal Circuit supported the practice 
of delaying patent applications to incorporate new and competing 
technology as an accepted form of “commercial gamesmanship.”82 
                                                          
 77. As noted in the opinion, “inequitable conduct” is a distinct, specific, 
equitable defense based on a patentee’s alleged intent to deceive the PTO by either 
failing to disclose material information or submitting false material information, 
during the prosecution of the claims at issue.  Ford Motor, 1995 WL 628330, at *6 
n.12.  See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000) (providing that, in suits for patent infringement, the 
defense of “[n]oninfringement, absence of liability for infringement or 
unenforceability” may be raised). 
 78. Ford Motor, 1995 WL 628330, at *6. 
 79. Id. at *6. 
 80. See id. at **6-10, 12 (holding that the courts have not yet addressed factual 
scenarios such as the one presented in Ford Motor and additionally noting that 
Lemelson’s focus on the PTO’s prosecution process was not relevant since the 
disputed delay pertained only to Lemelson’s actions during the claim application 
process). 
 81. See id. at **13-15 (noting that this practice frustrates the public policy 
surrounding patent protection).  As evidence supporting her finding regarding the 
reason for the delay, the magistrate judge quoted from a letter written by Lemelson’s 
attorney on Lemelson’s behalf during license negotiations with a third party: 
I pointed out that Mr. Lemelson currently has more than one hundred fifty 
issued and unexpired patents and more than fifty pending applications and 
that patents are being filed and issued at the rate of ten to fifteen per year.  
The claims of the pending applications are all being carefully drawn to cover practices 
in widespread commercial use.  In this regard, we anticipate that more than one 
hundred fifty claims covering commercial bar coding practices will issue by 
mid-1992 with an effective 1956 filing date based on the disclosure of the 
Lemelson . . . patents. 
Id. at *13 (emphasis added). 
 82. Id. at **13-15.  As described in the magistrate judge’s opinion, this argument 
originates from a pair of Federal Circuit cases. 
In Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 874, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1384, 1390 (Fed. Cir. 1988), the court rejected an argument that amending 
or adding claims to a pending patent application for the purpose of covering 
another party’s product on the market constitutes inequitable conduct.  Specifically, 
the Federal Circuit in Kingsdown stated: 
[T]here is nothing improper, illegal or inequitable in filing a patent 
application for the purpose of obtaining a right to exclude a known 
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Nearly one year later, the district court adopted, without comment, 
the recommendation of the magistrate judge and entered summary 
judgment in favor of the accused infringer.83  Another year later, 
upon reconsideration, the court vacated its order of adoption.84  The 
court justified its action by noting that other courts had been 
reluctant to introduce considerations of equity into the statutorily-
authorized scheme of continuation applications, and attributed that 
reluctance, with approval, to the absence of statutory limits on 
continuation practice.85  The court distinguished the rationale of 
                                                          
competitor’s product from the market; nor is it in any manner improper to 
amend to insert claims intended to cover a competitor’s product the 
applicant’s attorney has learned about during the prosecution of a patent 
application.  Any such amendment or insertion must comply with all statutes 
and regulations, of course, but, if it does, its genesis in the marketplace is 
simply irrelevant and cannot of itself evidence deceitful intent. 
Id. at 874, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1390. 
In State Industries, Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1234-37, 224 U.S.P.Q. 
(BNA) 418, 423-26 (Fed. Cir. 1985), the court refused to regard a defendant’s efforts 
to produce a competing non-infringing product, which were ultimately unsuccessful 
because the patentee later amended a pending application for the express purpose 
of covering the product, as willful infringement.  There, the court stated that 
competitors often attempt to assimilate each other’s new product concepts into their 
pending patent applications, justifying their actions by claiming the new 
improvement as part of their own invention.  State Indus., 751 F.2d at 1235, 224 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 424.  “This is a classic commercial gamesmanship under the 
patent system but it is not the kind of behavior courts have categorized in the past as 
willful infringement, which requires knowledge of the patent.”  Id., 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 
at 424. 
The magistrate judge in Ford Motor regarded these statements in Kingsdown and 
State Industries as inapposite, remarking that, in contrast to “Lemelson’s seemingly 
infinite introduction of new claims after he has already obtained patents on the 
related technology,” Kingsdown involved a six and a half year “‘complex prosecution, 
involving submission, rejection, amendment, renumbering, etc., of 118 claims, a 
continuation application, an appeal, a petition to make special, and citation and 
discussion of 44 references,’” and stands only for the proposition “that drawing 
claims to read on currently marketed technology is not in itself evidence of intent to 
act inequitably.”  Ford Motor, 1995 WL 628330, at *14 (quoting Kingsdown, 863 F.2d at 
869, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1386).  Further, in the view of the magistrate judge, the 
State Industries rationale applies to competing manufacturers designing around each 
other’s patent rights, not to a non-manufacturing patentee who “designs his claims 
on top of existing inventions for the purpose of creating infringements. . . .”  Id. 
It should also be noted that neither Kingsdown nor State Industries involved 
allegations of unreasonable prosecution delay or the associated equitable concerns.  
In fact, the court in State Industries referred to the parties’ thrust and parry-like 
conduct as a “fair fight.”  See State Indus., 751 F.2d at 1236, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 424 
(noting that public policy dictates that inventors should be allowed to monitor new 
and competing products and to create equivalents unless the inventors do so in a 
wrongful manner). 
 83. Ford Motor Co. v. Lemelson, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1349, No. CV-N-92-545 
LDG, 1996 WL 673595 (D. Nev. Apr. 11, 1996). 
 84. Ford Motor Co. v. Lemelson, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1706, No. CV-N-92-613 
LDG, 1997 WL 294430 (D. Nev. Apr. 28, 1997). 
 85. See Ford Motor Co., 1997 WL 294430, at **3-6 (emphasizing the “clear and 
unambiguous language” of 35 U.S.C. § 120 and its legislative history as evidence of 
congressional intent to permit continuation applications). 
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Webster as limited to cases involving interferences.86  As to the specific 
facts present in the case before it, the court held that the application 
of laches inappropriately shifted the burden of establishing the 
defense to the patentee by requiring him to explain the delay when 
there was “no claim that [he] violated any statute or regulation.”87  
The court invoked the disclosure requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 11288 as 
the only limits on an applicant’s ability to add or amend claims 
during prosecution.89  Finally, although acknowledging Ford’s 
argument that the case at bar presented a prime example of facts 
justifying equitable intervention, the court reiterated its reluctance to 
limit patent rights obtained in reliance on the statute.90 
Even the relevant Federal Circuit decisions reflected disagreement 
regarding the viability of the defense of prosecution laches.  In 
Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbH v. Northern Petrochemical Co.,91 the court 
affirmed the district court’s ruling refusing to invalidate patent rights 
based on alleged inequitable prosecution delay.92  The claims in 
question had been issued twenty-two years after the priority 
application was filed in the PTO.93  Although they had apparently 
been pending throughout this period, their prosecution was 
suspended for over sixteen of the twenty-two years while several 
interferences involving the applicants’ related applications were 
resolved.94  According to the court, the applicants requested the 
suspension only as a fallback to their request that the PTO issue the 
claims in question before resolving the interferences.95  In addition, 
the court noted that the PTO did not act on the applicants’ first 
request to resume proceedings on the suspended application 
following the termination of some of the interferences, but rather, 
acted only after the applicants filed a second request.96  On this 
record, the court credited the district court’s findings that the PTO’s 
                                                          
 86. See id., 1997 WL 294430, at **5-6. 
 87. Id., 1997 WL 294430, at **5-6. 
 88. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000) (proscribing the required specificity standards for 
patent applications). 
 89. See Ford Motor, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1707-08, 1997 WL 294430, at **2-4 
(noting that, in accordance with Section 120, new and amended claims must relate 
to a specification disclosed in the originally filed application). 
 90. Id. at 1711, 1997 WL 294430, at *6.  The Federal Circuit denied Ford’s 
petition for permission to appeal the district court’s decision.  Ford Motor Co. v. 
Lemelson, No. Misc. 516, 1997 WL 547905 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 20, 1997). 
 91. 784 F.2d 351, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 837 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
 92. See id. at 356, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 841 (examining the actions of the patent 
applicants in obtaining the patent at issue). 
 93. Id. at 352, 356, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 838, 841. 
 94. Id. at 353, 356, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 839, 841. 
 95. Id. at 356, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 841. 
 96. Id., 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 841. 
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failure to act on the applicant’s first request caused the delay.97  The 
court further noted that the “the applicants’ actions in response . . . 
involved no deliberate or calculated delay on the part of the 
applicants or their attorneys.”98 
The Studiengesellschaft Kohle Court affirmed the district court on the 
ground that the delay was the fault of the PTO.99  It indicated no 
disapproval or doubt regarding the viability of the defense of 
prosecution laches.  Two years later, however, in Bott v. Four Star 
Corp.,100 a Federal Circuit panel, which included one member of the 
Studiengesellschaft Kohle panel,101 rejected an argument that a patentee 
should be equitably estopped from enforcing patent claims resulting 
from the seventh in a series of continuation applications.102  The 
court relied on the absence of a time limit in Section 120 and the 
presence of the two-year statutory limit on broadening reissues as 
evidence of congressional intent not to limit continuation practice.103  
It also expressly rejected the defendant’s arguments that the 
requested equitable relief remained available after the enactment of 
the 1952 Patent Act.104  In the same vein, three years ago in Ricoh Co. 
v. Nashua Corp.,105 the court refused to apply the doctrine of 
intervening rights to limit patent rights obtained via continuing 
applications.106 
In summary, many of the relevant pre-Symbol Technologies lower 
court decisions manifested significant judicial reluctance to act in 
equity to abrogate patent rights on the ground of prosecution delay.  
While a number of decisions indicate that the doctrine has vitality, 
some of those demonstrate confusion regarding its outlines.  For 
example, the opinion in Pratt & Whitney appears to describe a classic 
situation of prosecution laches by referencing the defendant’s 
intervening rights, relying on Webster, and finding no reasonable 
cause for the patentee’s delay in filing additional claims.107  On the 
                                                          
 97. Id., 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 841. 
 98. Id., 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 841. 
 99. Id., 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 841. 
 100. Nos. 88-1117, 88-1118, 1988 WL 54107 (Fed. Cir. May 26, 1988). 
 101. Circuit Judge Bissell participated on both panels. 
 102. See Bott, 1988 WL 54107, at *1 (noting that the plaintiff, Four Star Corp., 
argued for a two-year time limit on broadened claims similar to the time limit 
imposed on proceedings under 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000)). 
 103. Bott, 1988 WL 54107, at *1. 
 104. See id. (emphasizing the lack of evidence within the legislative history of the 
1952 Patent Act to support the application of equitable considerations). 
 105. No. 97-1244, 1999 WL 88969 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 18, 1999). 
 106. Id. at **2-3 (declining to adopt “equitable safeguards” where Congress had 
imposed none, as evinced by its decision not to impose on continuation practice 
limits comparable to those imposed on reissue applications). 
 107. See Pratt & Whitney Co. v. United States, 345 F.2d 838, 843-44, 145 U.S.P.Q. 
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other hand, however, it appears that the claims in question simply 
may not have been entitled to the benefit of the patent’s filing date.108 
Specifically, the Pratt & Whitney Court rejected as “not supported 
by the facts,” the plaintiffs’ argument that the claims in question were 
“not barred as a result of late claiming from claiming subject matter 
relating to the [accused device] because [the patentee] had been 
claiming in the patent application . . . the subject matter of the 
[patent in suit] before the advent of” the accused device.109  Although 
this language is admittedly unclear, it appears to invoke the 
prosecution laches doctrine.  However, the court also cited the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Muncie Gear Works, Inc. v. Outboard 
Marine & Manufacturing Co.110 that, although itself ambiguous, has 
been interpreted widely as standing for the proposition that claims 
dependent upon “new matter” introduced into a patent application 
after its original filing date are invalid if the claimed subject matter 
was in public use or on sale for longer than the applicable statutory 
bar period before the new disclosure was added.111  “New matter” 
concerns are entirely distinct from those that have motivated the 
application of prosecution laches, but the Muncie Gear Works decision 
is not the only decision evincing confusion between the doctrines. 
The Minnesota district court’s opinion in Honeywell Inc. v. Sperry 
Rand Corp.,112 concerning the validity and enforceability of claims 
broadened after prosecution delays, similarly intersperses references 
evocative of the Supreme Court’s prosecution laches decisions with 
references to new matter type concerns.113  The opinion further defies 
                                                          
(BNA) 429, 432-33 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (addressing whether the plaintiff’s six-year delay in 
filing the patent claims was unreasonable). 
 108. Such claims do not implicate the equity and policy concerns that underlie 
the prosecution laches doctrine, because they are typically subject to statutory validity 
challenges based on a broader pool of prior art than if they were entitled to the 
benefit of a priority date. 
 109. See id., 145 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 433 (noting that, at the earliest, the plaintiff 
introduced a claim that could cover the infringing device five years after the subject 
matter of the parent application had been exposed to the public). 
 110. 315 U.S. 759 (1942). 
 111. See, e.g., Westphal v. Fawzi, 666 F.2d 575, 577, 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 321, 322-23 
(C.C.P.A. 1981) (repudiating the theory, known as “late claiming,” that claims 
presented during prosecution, but that are entitled to the benefit of an earlier filing 
date, could nonetheless be barred by intervening rights under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) 
(2000)); Jacquard Knitting Mach. Co. v. Ordnance Gauge Co., 95 F. Supp. 902, 906-
07, 88 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 348, 350-51 (E.D. Pa. 1951) (rejecting the patent challenger’s 
argument proposing that claims supported by the disclosure of a domestic priority 
application were nonetheless barred by public use of the invention for longer than 
the statutory pre-filing bar period prior to their presentation in the Patent Office). 
 112. 180 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 673, No. 4-67 Civ. 138, 1973 WL 903 (D. Minn. Oct. 19, 
1973). 
 113. See id. at *7.  The court found that an amendment filed sixteen years after the 
application filing date for the purpose of broadening the definition of a claim term 
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interpretation by holding the claims affected by the broadening 
amendment invalid for “late claiming” as a result of the 
“unreasonable delay” in presenting the amendment, while also 
finding that no undue or intentional delay in prosecution or issuance 
of the patent existed, apparently because the application “did not 
exceed any time limits provided either by court order, rule, or 
statute.”114  Ultimately, the court concluded that although the 
patentee did not “deliberately extend the expiration of a monopoly” 
to cause an undue delay, the patent was still unenforceable because 
of “inherent consequences of delay in issuance due to six years of 
inadequate presentation” on the part of the patentee and its legal 
counsel.115 
This language is immediately followed with the following 
statement, compounding the confusion: 
Where many persons were at work in the same field and had made 
advances in the art, and where the applicant learns of such work 
and is aware that his original claims might not cover the real 
advance made by his competitors, an intentional delay in the 
prosecution of the patent to enable later changes in the 
specification and claims so that the work of the other inventors 
might be covered, renders the patent invalid.116 
Ultimately, the Federal Circuit’s recent decision in Symbol 
Technologies, and the ethics implications of that decision, must be 
considered in light of the ambivalence and ambiguity in the decisions 
that preceded it. 
 
                                                          
was an “exigent afterthought to capture the subsequent contributions of others 
already in the public domain.”  Id.  The court discussed the “prior rights 
intervening”—specifically, the “widespread manufacture, use and sale of computers” 
having the capability recited in the broadening amendment—between the 
application filing and amendment submission dates.  Id.  It observed that “late 
claims” are invalid where an applicant “stands by to await developments in the 
industry before asserting them,” but it also found, that “[w]here a late-filed 
amendment of the patent specification is important enough to constitute the basis 
for alleged patentability, the amendment constitutes new matter and cannot in fact 
be a basis for patentability.”  Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
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II. SYMBOL TECHNOLOGIES, INC. V. LEMELSON MEDICAL:  A DIVIDED 
FEDERAL CIRCUIT PANEL ROCKS THE BOAT (AND MUDDIES THE 
WATERS) 
A. A New Challenge 
A little over a year after the decision of the Nevada district court 
denying Ford’s motion for summary judgment and holding that 
Lemelson’s patents were not unenforceable for continuing 
application laches, several manufacturers of products incorporating 
bar code technology filed declaratory judgment actions against the 
Lemelson Medical, Education and Research Foundation (the 
“Foundation”), the for-profit assignee of Lemelson’s patents.117  The 
manufacturers sought judgments that certain Foundation patents 
were “invalid, unenforceable and not infringed by” them or their 
customers.118  The district court granted the Foundation’s motion to 
dismiss the plaintiff’s prosecution laches cause of action on the 
ground that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted.119 
In its January 2002 decision on the plaintiffs’ appeal, the Federal 
Circuit characterized the “sole issue” as whether the doctrine of 
prosecution laches is available as a defense to claims of patent 
infringement that commenced after unreasonable and unexplained 
delay despite the applicant’s compliance with the relevant rules and 
regulations.120  The panel majority answered in the affirmative, citing 
Woodbridge, Webster, and General Talking Pictures.121  It rejected the 
Foundation’s arguments that Webster was limited to interferences122 
and that the 1952 Patent Act abrogated the defense.123  With regard to 
the latter, the majority, noted in particular, the specific enumeration 
                                                          
 117. See Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., 277 F.3d 1361, 1363, 1368, 61 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1515, 1516, 1520 (Fed. Cir. 2002), petition for reh’g and reh’g en banc 
denied, No. 00-1583, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 7712 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 20, 2002); see also 
Neil Gross, Bar-Code Patents May Go Before the Bar, Again, BUS. WEEK, Nov. 2, 1998, at 
131 (reporting the initiation of litigation by Cognex Corp.); Varchaver, supra note 
71, at 216 (noting that seven other manufacturers followed suit). 
 118. Symbol Techs., 277 F.3d at 1363, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1516. 
 119. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1516. 
 120. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1516. 
 121. Id. at 1363-65, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1516-18.  The Court subsequently 
extended the Symbol Technologies principle, holding that the PTO has the authority to 
refuse to issue a patent where the applicant has “fail[ed] to advance prosecution of 
his application for an unreasonably long period.”  See In re Bogese, 303 F.3d 1362, 
1367, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1448, 1452 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 122. See id. at 1365, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1450-51; see also Thomas Eschweiler, 
supra note 7, at 458 (taking issue with the Ford Motor Court’s limitation of Webster to 
interferences). 
 123. Symbol Techs., 277 F.3d at 1365-66, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1517-19. 
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of “unenforceability” among defenses available to a charge of 
infringement in 35 U.S.C. § 282(1),124 and cited the comments of one 
of the drafters of the Act that Section 282 includes “‘equitable 
defenses such as laches, estoppel and unclean hands.’”125 
In dissent, Judge Newman distinguished Woodbridge as involving an 
inventor who lost his right on statutory grounds and Webster as 
“directed to interference practice.”126  The judge seemed persuaded 
that the 1952 Act at least reflected congressional intent that the 
courts should refrain from punishing conduct that complies with the 
statutes.127  Emphasizing that a patent obtained “in accordance with 
law” is a statutory property right, Judge Newman also regarded as 
significant Congress’s decision to spare patents issued on applications 
filed before June 8, 1995 from the twenty-year term.128  She also 
pointed out the practical consequences of the majority’s decision, 
noting that “[i]t simply adds to the uncertainties of the patent grant,” 
and “open[s] legally granted patents to a new source of satellite 
litigation of unforeseen scope, for the continuation practice is 
ubiquitous in patent prosecution.”129 
B. A Correct Decision 
The Federal Circuit majority in Symbol Technologies correctly held 
that prosecution laches, recognized and applied in several Supreme 
Court decisions, survived the 1952 codification of the law relating to 
continuing applications.  The Supreme Court’s application of 
prosecution laches130 and its apparent ratification of the then-
common law continuing application practice,131 the absence of any 
                                                          
 124. 35 U.S.C. § 282(1) (2000). 
 125. Symbol Techs., 277 F.3d at 1366, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1519 (quoting P.J. 
Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 161, 
215 (1993)).  The majority also rejected the Foundation’s argument that its opinions 
in Bott and Ricoh were binding on the court.  See id. at 1366-68, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
at 1518-20. 
 126. See id. at 1368-70, 61U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1520-22 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 127. Judge Newman repeatedly noted that Lemelson complied fully with all 
applicable statutes and regulations in procuring the patents at issue.  Id. at 1368-71, 
61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1520-23. 
 128. See id. at 1371, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522. 
 129. Id. at 1369, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1521. 
 130. See supra notes 8-29 and accompanying text. 
 131. See, e.g., Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Ferdinand Gutmann Co., 304 U.S. 159, 
164-68 (1938) (holding that a nine and one-half year delay by a patent applicant in 
order to maximize his profits constituted unreasonable delay, making laches 
applicable); Chapman v. Wintroath, 252 U.S. 126, 137 (1920) (holding that, absent 
applicant wrongdoing, a patent applicant’s statutory rights may not be denied merely 
because a delay in exercising those rights may cause prejudice).  See also Godfrey v. 
Eames, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 317, 325-26 (1864), where the Court stated: 
[I]f a party choose to withdraw his application for a patent, and pay the 
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legislative history evidencing congressional intent to abrogate the 
defense,132 and the enumeration of the defense of “unenforceability” 
in 35 U.S.C. § 282(1)133 compel this conclusion.  Federal courts 
indisputably possess the authority to act in equity to limit rights—
even statutory rights.  For example, there is no basis for conceding 
that courts can abrogate or limit a statutory right to patent damages 
on account of pre-enforcement laches134 while denying, or even 
advocating that they restrain from exercising, their power to declare 
forfeited the statutory right to enforce patent claims against an 
infringer.135 
Analogy to unenforceability for inequitable conduct is also 
appropriate.  A determination of inequitable conduct results in the 
complete unenforceability of a patent’s claims, even those untainted 
by the deception.136  Accordingly, that the PTO Rules of Practice in 
Patent Cases expressly impose a “duty of candor and good faith” on 
patent applicants does not undermine the parallelism.137  This is 
because untainted claims—those obtained in compliance with 
statutory and regulatory requirements—are subject to abrogation.  
The Code of Federal Regulations Title 37, Section 1.56 states that “no 
patent will be granted on an application in connection with which 
fraud on the Office was practiced or attempted or the duty of 
                                                          
forfeit, intending at the time of such withdrawal to file a new petition, and 
he accordingly do so, the two petitions are to be considered as parts of the 
same transaction, and both as constituting one continuous application, 
within the meaning of the law. 
 132. See Symbol Techs., 277 F.3d at 1365-66, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1517-18 (“The 
legislative history of Section 120 does not indicate any congressional intent to alter 
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of continuing application practices”) (quoting 
Transco Prods. Inc. v. Performance Contracting, Inc., 38 F.3d 551, 556-57, 32 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1077, 1081 (Fed. Cir. 1994); see also Eschweiler, supra note 7, at 
408-13 (discussing the impact of the passage of Section 120 on the defense of 
prosecution laches); Marcus, supra note 37, at 560-63 (discussing that the 1952 Act 
did not materially change existing law governing the defenses available to 
infringement, among which is laches). 
 133. 35 U.S.C. § 282(1) (2000). 
 134. See, e.g., A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1031, 
22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1232, 1327-28 (1992) (holding that the right to interpose the 
equitable defense of laches in patent litigation is still available). 
 135. See 35 U.S.C. § 281 (2000) (“A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for 
infringement of his patent.”). 
 136. See, e.g., Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 
877, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1384, 1392 (1998) (“When a court has finally determined 
that inequitable conduct occurred in relation to one or more claims during 
prosecution of the patent application, the entire patent is rendered unenforceable.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 137. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2003).  Furthermore, it has been argued that “Rule 56 is 
outside . . . the PTO’s rulemaking authority and even the Administrative Procedure 
Act.”  See Carl M. Moy, The Effect of Rule 56 on the Law of Inequitable Conduct, 74 J. PAT. 
& TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 257, 259 (1992).  If so, the courts’ authority to declare 
patents unenforceable for inequitable conduct is entirely non-statutory. 
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disclosure was violated through bad faith or intentional 
misconduct.”138  This statement does not provide a basis for 
distinguishing the court’s power to declare unenforceable patents 
procured via inequitable conduct from those procured in compliance 
with congressionally-authorized regulation, given the PTO’s 1988 
proclamation that it would “no longer investigate . . . applications 
under 37 C.F.R. 1.56.”139 
C. A Host of Questions 
Although the Symbol Technologies’ majority correctly applied the law 
of prosecution laches, Judge Newman’s assessment of the decision’s 
implications is undeniably accurate.  Regardless of the resolution of 
this case,140 the Federal Circuit’s ruling introduces new uncertainties 
for some patentees141 and will foster additional litigation.142  Unless 
the Federal Circuit repudiates its January 2002 decision,143 or the 
Supreme Court ultimately rejects the viability of the doctrine,144 
                                                          
 138. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2003); see also PTO Notice Regarding Implementation of 37 
C.F.R. § 221.56, 1095 OFF. GAZ. PAT. OFF. 16 (Sept. 8, 1988). 
 139. Id. 
   140. On January 23, 2004, the district court held the asserted claims in the 
patents-in-suit in Symbol Technologies “unenforceable due to prosecution laches.”  
Symbol Techs. Inc. v. Lemelson Med., 2004 WL 161331, at *5 (D. Nev. Jan. 23, 2004).  
The court noted that “[d]ecades of delay preceded the assertion of patent claims and 
Lemelson has offered no adequate explanation for that delay.”  Id. at *5.  The court 
further noted the “intervening private and public rights . . . evidenced by the use of 
products developed, manufactured and sold by [the declaratory judgment plaintiffs] 
as well as by third-party products, patents and articles . . . .”  Id. at *6.  The Federal 
Circuit may, therefore, have an opportunity shortly to confirm and further define the 
doctrine of prosecution laches.  
 141. Even the court in Ford Motor suggested that the Lemelson saga presents a 
situation unparalleled in its aggressive use of the patent system.  Ford Motor Co. v. 
Lemelson, Nos. CV-N-92-613-LDG, CV-N-92-545-LDG, 1995 WL 628330 (D. Nev. June 
16, 1995).  As a consequence, a decision holding the patent rights at issue 
unenforceable may provide little guidance for other cases. 
 142. See Symbol Techs. Inc. v. Lemelson Med., 277 F.3d 1361, 1368-70, 61 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1515, 1520-22 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Newman, J., dissenting) 
(discussing the concern that the majority’s decision in Symbol Technologies will create a 
“new source of satellite litigation of unforeseen scope”); see, e.g., Oxaal v. Internet 
Pictures Corp., No. 00CV1863, 2002 WL 485704, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2002) 
(granting defendant’s motion seeking an order for leave to file and serve an 
amended answer asserting the defense of prosecution laches in light of the Federal 
Circuit’s decision in Symbol Technologies). 
 143. Three Federal Circuit judges voted to rehear the appeal in Symbol Technologies 
en banc, while another five did not participate in the vote.  See Symbol Techs. Inc. v. 
Lemelson Med., No. 00-1583, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 7712, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 20, 
2002). 
 144. Such a result seems unlikely given the relative rarity of Supreme Court review 
and the Court’s own prior decisions on the subject.  On the other hand, those 
decisions did precede all of the very significant legislative activity in the patent arena 
in the last fifty years.  Additionally, Judge Newman’s description of a patent as a 
“property right,” Symbol Technologies, 277 F.3d at 1371, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522, 
has added significance due to the Supreme Court’s incorporation of the same 
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attempts by litigants to explore the boundaries of the prosecution 
laches defense can be expected. 
This litigation will likely involve all of the questions left open by the 
Supreme Court’s prosecution laches jurisprudence,145 in addition to 
those issues muddied by other courts that have encountered the 
doctrine.146  The Federal Circuit’s recent decision requires, 
appropriately, prejudice to intervening adverse rights.147  The Federal 
Circuit’s interpretation of the Supreme Court precedent also 
arguably suggests that the addition or expansion of claims following 
applicant delay is necessary to assert the defense of laches.148  But 
definitive answers to these and many other questions await resolution 
of Symbol Technologies and other cases. 
Among the most significant of the unresolved questions is whether 
the twenty-year term relegates the doctrine—just roused from 
slumber—to “flash in the pan” status.  Patents issued on applications 
filed on or after June 8, 1995, have a maximum potential term of 
twenty years from the filing date of the first domestic priority 
application.149  One view is that the issue of prosecution laches is, as a 
result, “going away.”150  Another holds that where the patents at issue 
concern fast-developing technology, courts may be receptive to the 
defense of prosecution laches even when the twenty-year term 
                                                          
reference in its recent unanimous opinion vacating the Federal Circuit’s decision 
circumscribing the doctrine of equivalents.  See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku 
Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 730, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1709 (2002). 
 145. See supra notes 48-56 and accompanying text. 
 146. See supra notes 107-116 and accompanying text. 
 147. See Symbol Techs., 277 F.3d at 1364-65, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1517-18. 
 148. See id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1517-18.  The court in Progressive Games v. 
Amusements Extra, Inc., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1184 n.1, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1849, 
1852 n.1 (D. Colo. 1999), purported that “adverse intervening rights” require the 
addition of broadened claims after the rise of third party rights.  Such an 
interpretation appears necessary to any prosecution laches challenge to a patent, 
subject to the twenty-year term, especially if the application(s) in question were 
published during their pendency.  Otherwise, the challenger could not establish the 
requisite prejudice.  However, neither Supreme Court precedent nor policy 
considerations compel such an interpretation of patents procured via applications 
filed before the twenty-year term took effect.  In such cases, prejudice could, for 
example, result simply from unreasonable delay in permitting claims pending before 
the adverse rights arose to issue, because the potential term of enforcement had, 
thereby, been extended. 
 149. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000).  Had this been the law when the patents at 
issue in the Ford Motor and Symbol Technologies cases were procured, for example, the 
latest those patents would have been in force would have been 1976. 
The publication of pending U.S. patent applications pursuant to the recently-
enacted 35 U.S.C. § 122(b) (2000) should certainly impair the ability of patent 
challengers to establish prosecution laches, since presumably no prejudice as to the 
subject matter of published claims could be shown.  Of course not all pending U.S. 
applications—even  those filed on or after the effective date of the new eighteen-
month publication requirements—are subject to publication.  See id. § 122(b)(2)(B). 
 150. See Eschweiler, supra note 7, at 426. 
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applies.151  Litigants can certainly be expected to advance these and 
other, even more creative, positions. 
III. PROSECUTION LACHES:  IMPLICATIONS FOR                             
PROSECUTION COUNSEL 
As discussed above, the Federal Circuit’s decision in Symbol 
Technologies is doctrinally sound.  Others will, no doubt, explore its 
propriety as a matter of judicial policy.  The focus of the present 
inquiry concerns the decision’s ramifications regarding the ethical 
obligations of patent prosecution counsel.  It is necessary to bear in 
mind the history of the prosecution laches doctrine when assessing 
those ramifications. 
All patent practitioners, including patent agents,152 are obligated to 
observe the PTO’s Code of Professional Responsibility (“PTO 
Code”),153 and are subject to discipline for violations thereof.154  
                                                          
 151. See Edward T. Colbert & Kenneth R. Corsello, Prosecution Laches, NAT’L L.J., 
Feb. 25, 2002, at A19.  The argument that a patent, subject to a twenty-year term, is 
per se immune from a prosecution laches challenge has been rejected in at least two 
rulings to date.  See Cummins-Allison Corp. v. Glory Ltd., No. 02C7008, 2003 WL 
355470, at *41 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 12, 2003) (finding that prosecution laches can be 
asserted, as a matter of law, in defense of post-GATT patents); Digital Control Inc. v. 
McLaughlin Mfg. Co., 225 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1228, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1786, 1790 
(W.D. Wash. 2002) (noting that “the impact of delay is less” for a twenty year term 
limited patent, but refusing to adopt a bright-line rule sparing such patents scrutiny).  
The court in Digital Control further refused to limit prosecution laches to patents not 
subject to a terminal disclaimer.  See id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1790.  See also 
Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 268 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1143 (E.D. Cal. 2002) 
(rejecting a “bright line rule” that prosecution laches does not apply to patents 
limited by a terminal disclaimer as “contrary to the principle that ‘with its origin in 
equity, a determination of laches is not made upon the application of mechanical 
rules’”) (quoting A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 
1032, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). 
Ultimately, the Digital Control Court granted the patentee’s motion for partial 
summary judgment on the defense of prosecution laches.  See Digital Control Inc. v. 
McLaughlin Mfg. Co., 248 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1017-19 (W.D. Wash. 2003).  There, the 
challenged continuation patents issued over the span of a decade following the filing 
of the original application, apparently after the PTO restricted prosecution in the 
original application to one of several claimed inventions.  See id. at 1017-19.  
According to the court, the patentee’s delay was “reasonable and explained by the 
directives of the PTO.”  Id. at 1019. 
The change in the length of the patent term does not, of course, directly affect the 
susceptibility, on prosecution laches grounds, of patents procured and patent 
applications filed before the twenty-year term took effect.  As noted above, however, 
Judge Newman invoked Congress’ decision to limit the applicability of the twenty-
year term to patents issued on applications filed on or after June 8, 1995 as evidence 
of its intent to reject limits on earlier-filed continuation applications. 
 152. As to patent matters, the PTO defines “practitioner” as “an attorney or agent 
registered to practice before the Office . . . .”  37 C.F.R. § 10.1(r) (2003). 
   153. The PTO recently issued a comprehensive set of proposed rules relating to 
client representation, including new professional responsibility rules which would 
replace the current PTO Code.  Changes to Representation of Others Before the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office, 68 Fed. Reg. 69442 (2003) (to be 
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Several provisions of the PTO Code155 are potentially implicated by 
conduct that arguably constitutes or facilitates prosecution laches.  A 
discussion of the appropriate interpretation of these provisions in the 
context of prosecution laches follows an identification of some of 
those provisions.156 
A. Potentially Relevant PTO Rules 
1. Signature and certification requirements 
The provisions of 37 C.F.R. § 10.18 correspond, in significant 
respect, to those of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 11.157  
Section 10.18 requires that all documents filed in the PTO in patent 
matters, except those that require the applicant’s signature, be signed 
by the practitioner filing the document.158  The section further 
provides that: 
                                                          
codified at 37 C.F.R. pts. 1, 2, 10, & 11) (proposed Dec. 12, 2003).  The proposed 
rules carry forward, in large measure, the principles and provisions discussed in this 
Article.  For example, proposed Section 11.18 and proposed Rule 11.804 maintain 
the signature and certification requirements of current Section 10.18 and the 
misconduct prohibitions current Rule 10.23, respectively, in material respect.  
Proposed Rule 11.302(b) corresponds in material respect to current Rule 10.85(a).  
Interestingly, however, proposed Rule 11.302(a) embodies essential ethical tension a 
practitioner faces when representing a client whose interests are served by delaying, 
stating “[a] practitioner shall make reasonable efforts to expedite proceedings 
before the [PTO] consistent with the interests of the client.” 
The PTO recently extended the comment period for the proposed professional 
responsibility rules.  Notice of Extension of Comment Period, 69 Fed. Reg. 4269 
(Jan. 29, 2004).  The period is now set to expire on April 12, 2004. 
 154. See id. § 10.130.  Practitioners, licensed to practice by one or more attorney-
licensing authorities, are also potentially subject to discipline for violations of state 
ethics rules.  See Kroll v. Finnerty, 242 F.3d 1359, 1366, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097, 
1102 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that the PTO Rules do not preempt state law 
governing the practice of law).  However, because this section concerns prosecution 
activities, it focuses on the PTO’s ethics requirements. 
 155. PTO Rule 10.18, discussed infra notes 157-158 and 176-179 and 
accompanying text, is codified apart from the rules—37 C.F.R. § 10.20-.129—that 
constitute the PTO Code.  As discussed infra note 159 and accompanying text, 
however, Rule 10.18 includes its own provision for disciplinary sanction for violations 
thereof. 
 156. The discussion that follows is intended merely to illustrate that prosecution 
laches, in the wake of the Federal Circuit’s decision in Symbol Technologies potentially 
implicates a practitioner’s ethical responsibilities.  It is not intended as a 
comprehensive analysis of every PTO ethics rule that could conceivably be 
interpreted to apply to prosecution laches. 
 157. Compare 37 C.F.R. § 10.18 (2002) (explaining that documents filed with PTO 
must be signed, and that the signature denotes, among other things, that statements 
within document are true and are not presented for improper purpose), with FED. R. 
CIV. P. 11 (indicating that documents filed in federal court must be signed by an 
attorney and that the signature denotes, among other things, that documents are not 
presented for an improper purpose and that allegations within them are supported 
by evidence). 
 158. 37 C.F.R. § 10.18(a) (2002). 
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By presenting to the Office (whether by signing, filing, submitting, 
or later advocating) any paper, the party presenting such paper, 
whether a practitioner or non-practitioner, is certifying that . . . 
[t]o the best of the party’s knowledge, information and belief, 
formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, . . . 
[t]he paper is not being presented for any improper purpose, such 
as to harass someone or to cause unnecessary delay or needless 
increase in the cost of prosecution before the Office . . . .159 
Violations of this provision “are, after notice and reasonable 
opportunity to respond, subject to such sanctions as deemed 
appropriate by the Commissioner, or the Commissioner’s 
designee.”160  Furthermore, “[a]ny practitioner violating the 
provisions of this section may also be subject to disciplinary action.”161 
2. PTO disciplinary rules 
The PTO Code, patterned in significant part after the American 
Bar Association’s “Model Code of Professional Responsibility,”162 
consists of nine “Canons” and numerous associated “Disciplinary 
Rules.”  Canons are defined as “statements of axiomatic norms, 
expressing in general terms the standards of professional conduct 
expected of practitioners in their relationships with the public, with 
the legal system, and with the legal profession.”163  Disciplinary Rules, 
however, are “mandatory in character and state the minimum level of 
conduct below which no practitioner can fall without being subjected 
to disciplinary action.”164  PTO regulations authorize the investigation 
of possible Disciplinary Rule violations, the initiation of and 
procedures for proceedings to resolve disciplinary charges, and the 
imposition of sanctions for violations.165 
                                                          
 159. Id. § 10.18(b)(2)(i). 
 160. Id. § 10.18(c).  According to the rule, the potential sanctions for violating the 
“improper purpose” rule include, but are not limited to, any combination of: 
(1) Holding certain facts to have been established; 
(2) Returning papers; 
(3) Precluding a party from filing a paper, or presenting or contesting an 
issue; 
(4) Imposing a monetary sanction; 
(5) Requiring a terminal disclaimer for the period of the delay; or 
(6) Terminating the proceedings in the Patent and Trademark Office. 
Id. § 10.18(c). 
 161. Id. § 10.18(d). 
 162. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY (1969). 
 163. 37 C.F.R. § 10.20(a) (2003). 
 164. Id. § 10.20(b). 
 165. Id. §§ 10.130-.170. 
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a. Negative rules (prohibitions) 
Several Disciplinary Rules are potentially implicated by conduct 
constituting prosecution laches.  Rule 10.23(a) states that “[a] 
practitioner shall not engage in disreputable or gross misconduct.”166  
Rule 10.23(b) recites a list of “shall nots” for practitioners, including 
prohibitions against “[v]iolat[ing] a Disciplinary Rule,” and 
“[e]ngag[ing] in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of 
justice.”167  More particularly, Rule 10.23(c) provides that “[c]onduct 
which constitutes a violation of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section 
includes, but is not limited to”168 a long list of specifically enumerated 
offenses, including “[s]igning a paper filed in the Office in violation 
of the provisions of § 10.18.”169  This provision therefore expressly 
brings violations of the signing and certifications provisions quoted 
above within the purview of the investigation and adjudication system 
established for PTO Code violations. 
Rules 10.39 and 10.85 may also be relevant.  Rule 10.39(a), for 
example, provides that: 
A practitioner shall not accept employment on behalf of a person if 
the practitioner knows or it is obvious that such person wishes to: 
(a) Bring a legal action, commence a proceeding before the Office, 
conduct a defense, assert a position in any proceeding pending 
before the Office, or otherwise have steps taken for the person, 
merely for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring any 
other person.170 
According to Rule 10.85(a), while representing a client, [a] 
practitioner shall not: 
(1) Initiate or defend any proceeding before the Office, assert a 
position, conduct a defense, delay a trial or proceeding before the 
Office, or take other action on behalf of the practitioner’s client 
when the practitioner knows or when it is obvious that such action 
would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another . . . [or] 
(8) Knowingly engage in other illegal conduct or conduct contrary 
to a Disciplinary Rule.171 
Furthermore, “[i]n appearing in a professional capacity before a 
tribunal, a practitioner shall not . . . [i]ntentionally or habitually 
violate any provision of this subchapter.”172 
                                                          
 166. Id. § 10.23(a). 
 167. Id. § 10.23(b)(1), (5). 
 168. Id. § 10.23(c). 
 169. Id. § 10.23(c)(15). 
 170. Id. § 10.39(a). 
 171. Id. § 10.85(a)(1), (8). 
 172. Id. § 10.89(c)(6).  The rules define “tribunal” as including the PTO itself.  See 
DOLAK.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC 7/6/2004  7:30 PM 
768 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:739 
b. Positive rules (obligations) 
These prohibitions must be balanced against the affirmative 
obligations imposed by the PTO Code.  These affirmative 
prohibitions include the requirement, set forth in Rule 10.84, 
entitled “Representing a client zealously,” that “a practitioner shall 
not intentionally . . . [f]ail to seek the lawful objectives of a client 
through reasonably available means permitted by law and the 
Disciplinary Rules.”173  The same rule, however, permits a practitioner 
to “[r]efuse to aid or participate in conduct that the practitioner 
believes to be unlawful, even though there is some support for an 
argument that the conduct is legal.”174  A practitioner must also 
preserve his or her client’s “confidence[s]” and “secret[s].”175 
B. A New Ethical Dilemma? 
The rules identified above can be read to encompass conduct 
constituting or contributing to prosecution laches.  Rule 
10.18(b)(2)(i) expressly requires a practitioner to certify, each time 
she files a paper, that the paper is not being filed “to cause 
unnecessary delay.”176  Presumably, in a case justifying the exercise of 
equitable relief based on prosecution laches, attorneys filed several 
(perhaps numerous) papers including continuation applications, 
petitions for extensions of time to respond, and responses the 
practitioner knew would not advance the prosecution.  As far as the 
accused infringer177 and the PTO are concerned, such documents 
                                                          
id. § 10.1(z) (2003) (instructing that “tribunal” includes “the Office,” which is 
defined in subsection (p) as “Patent and Trademark Office”). 
 173. Id. § 10.84(a)(1) (2003).  Although Rule 10.84 expresses its requirements as 
negative prohibitions (e.g., “shall not . . . fail”), Rule 10.84(a)(1) effectively obligates 
practitioner to “seek the lawful objectives” of their clients.  Id. 
 174. Id. § 10.84(b)(2). 
 175. Id. § 10.57(b)(1).  A “confidence” is “information protected by the attorney-
client or agent-client privilege under applicable law.”  Id. § 10.57(a).  A “secret” is 
“other information gained in the professional relationship that the client has 
requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or 
would be likely to be detrimental to the client.”  Id. 
In certain specified circumstances, Rule 10.57 authorizes, but does not require, the 
disclosure of client confidences and secrets.  See id. § 10.57(c) (allowing disclosure 
with consent of client, when permitted or required by law or Disciplinary Rules, or as 
necessary to collect fees and defend against accusations of wrongful conduct). 
 176. Id. § 10.18(b)(2)(i). 
 177. Interestingly, at least one accused infringer supplemented its prosecution 
laches defense with an argument that the patent in question should not be enforced 
because Rule 10.18 was violated.  See Bott v. Four Star Corp., Nos. 88-1117, 88-1118, 
1988 WL 54107, at *2 (Fed. Cir. May 26, 1988).  Although Federal Circuit rules 
prohibit citation of the opinion in Bott, it is worth noting that the court did not 
dismiss this argument out-of-hand, stating only that the defendant had “alleged 
generally that this rule was violated but has not set forth facts to support any specific 
violation.”  Bott, 1988 WL 54107, at *2. 
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were produced to cause “unnecessary delay” and/or “needless 
increase in the cost of prosecution before the Office.”178  Given the 
requirement that a party asserting prosecution laches demonstrate 
prejudice, it can even be argued that a late-filed amendment 
presenting claims calculated to cover the intervening products of that 
party was presented “to harass” it, in violation of Rule 
10.18(b)(2)(i).179 
The latter interpretation would also arguably implicate Rule 
10.39(a), to the extent “the practitioner knows or it is obvious that 
[his client] wishes,” for example, “to . . . assert a position . . . or 
otherwise have steps taken . . . merely for the purpose of harassing or 
maliciously injuring any other person.”180  The elements of 
prosecution laches, unreasonable delay plus prejudice, possess 
considerable symmetry with the conduct prohibited by Rule 
10.85(a)(1), namely that a practitioner shall not delay a proceeding 
in the PTO “when [he] knows or when it is obvious that such action 
would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another.”181 
However, a number of considerations counsel restraint, for the 
time being at least, in applying the disciplinary rules to prosecution 
laches situations.  Principal among these is the fact that the Federal 
Circuit’s Symbol Technologies182 decision is very recent.  Its procedural 
posture, a successful appeal from a dismissal for failure to state a 
claim, is also significant.  All the Federal Circuit has said, thus far, is 
that it is possible to state a prosecution laches-based challenge.183  
Much about when such a challenge should be regarded as successful 
remains to be determined, both in any appeal from the remand 
determination in Symbol Technologies and in future cases.  The 
decision is thus very preliminary, and when viewed against the 
background of its rather tortured history,184 it is properly regarded as 
a significant departure from prior law.185 
                                                          
 178. 37 C.F.R. § 10.18(b)(2)(i) (2002). 
 179. Id. § 10.18(b)(2)(i).  The same analysis would apply to Rule 10.23(c)(15), as 
it prohibits violations of Rule 10.18. 
 180. Id. § 10.39(a). 
 181. Id. § 10.85(a)(1). 
 182. Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., 277 F.3d 1361, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1515 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 183. See id. at 1366, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1519 (reversing lower court decision 
that defense of prosecution laches was unavailable as a matter of law, thus allowing 
Symbol Technologies to assert defense on remand). 
 184. See supra discussion Part I (explaining the reluctance of many courts to 
employ prosecution laches doctrine, despite recognition by many that the doctrine is 
viable, because of confusion about the doctrine’s parameters). 
 185. The District Court for the Northern District of New York recently cited the 
significance of this change in its decision to grant an infringement defendant leave 
to amend its answer to assert prosecution laches.  See Oxaal v. Internet Pictures 
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Furthermore, notwithstanding the magistrate judge’s analysis in 
Ford Motor,186 the Federal Circuit’s en banc holding in Kingsdown that it 
is not “improper to amend or insert claims intended to cover a 
competitor’s product the applicant’s attorney has learned about 
during the prosecution of a patent application,”187 cannot be readily 
dismissed, at least not in the context of considering potential ethical 
implications of prosecution laches.  Admittedly, Kingsdown did not 
involve allegations of unreasonable prosecution delay.188  However, it 
pertained to another, significantly analogous, basis for holding claims 
unenforceable on grounds of equity—inequitable conduct.189  In 
addition, the language quoted from Kingsdown concerns the 
knowledge and conduct of the practitioner, and should, therefore, be 
given weighty consideration when evaluating past practitioner 
conduct.190  In view of these considerations, at least as to conduct 
predating the decision in Symbol Technologies that is alleged or even 
adjudicated to constitute prosecution laches, no ethical violations 
should be found. 
Even as to post-Symbol Technologies practitioner conduct, the many 
unresolved questions concerning prosecution laches, together with its 
legacy of confusion, should give the courts and disciplinary 
authorities pause in evaluating whether such conduct involves ethical 
violations.  As noted above, practitioners are duty-bound to represent 
their clients zealously.191  This obligation, combined with the 
prevailing uncertainty surrounding the defense of prosecution 
laches, entitles practitioners to the benefit of the doubt. 
On the other hand, practitioners are, as a result of the Symbol 
Technologies decision, “on notice.”  At a minimum, they have an 
obligation to monitor doctrinal developments, and be wary when they 
are instructed or when they suspect that their clients’ objectives 
include maintaining application pendency for the purpose of 
awaiting and responding, with new or amended claims, to 
                                                          
Corp., Nos. 13, 15, 2002 WL 485704, at *2 (N.D. N.Y. Mar. 27, 2002). 
 186. Ford Motor Co. v. Lemelson, Nos. CV-N-92-545-613-LDG, CV-N-92-545-LDG, 
1995 WL 628330 (D. Nev. June 16, 1995); see supra notes 74-82 and accompanying 
text (discussing the procedural history of the Lemelson cases). 
 187. Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 874, 9 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1384, 1390 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 188. Id. at 869, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1386. 
 189. Id. at 877, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1392. 
 190. See Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 268 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1143 (E.D. Cal. 
2002) (noting that although Kingsdown “did not address the question of how a long 
period of delay affects the equities,” its “discussion of what is and is not equitable 
behavior by patentees is relevant” to the issue of prosecution laches). 
 191. See 37 C.F.R. § 10.84 (2003). 
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marketplace developments.192  Practitioners should also re-familiarize 
themselves with the PTO’s rules regarding withdrawal from 
employment, which is required, for example, in circumstances that 
would preclude the acceptance of employment under Rule 10.39(a), 
or where “continued employment will result in violation of a 
Disciplinary Rule.”193 
CONCLUSION 
Although the Federal Circuit’s decision in Symbol Technologies opens 
a new avenue of defense for some accused infringers, declarations of 
unenforceability based on prosecution laches are likely to be reserved 
for the most extreme cases.  Disciplinary consequences for 
practitioners should be commensurably rare, even for post-Symbol 
Technologies conduct.  As discussed in the Article, the patent statute 
and rules of practice authorize, or at least do not proscribe, the 
conduct at issue, and the applicable ethics rules exert somewhat 
conflicting tensions upon practitioners.  However, while Symbol 
Technologies provides reason enough for practitioners to counsel their 
clients against unreasonable tactical delays, practitioners must 
recognize that their clients are not the only ones who risk severe 
consequences for such conduct. 
                                                          
 192. See Brasseler, U.S.A. I, L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp., 267 F.3d 1370, 60 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1482 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (upholding an award of attorneys’ fee in an 
on-sale bar case where Brasseler withheld information about sale from its attorneys 
and attorneys purposefully did not investigate matter).  Brasseler is relevant 
considering the PTO Code provisions requiring that practitioner conduct a 
reasonable investigation before submitting papers and imposing ethical obligations 
when the practitioner either knows or “it is obvious” that his client wishes to engage 
in proscribed conduct. 
 193. See 37 C.F.R. § 10.40(b) (2003); see also id. § 10.40(a), (c) (imposing 
limitations on a practitioner’s ability to withdraw from a proceeding before the 
PTO). 
